Upon reexamining its theoretical underpinnings, we conclude that the fresh-complaint doctrine, as traditionally defined, no longer provides a sound basis for the admission of evidence of extrajudicial statements made by the victim of a sexual offense in reporting the alleged crime.Īt the same time, however, we conclude that-setting aside the outdated notions upon which the doctrine traditionally has rested-the limited, nonhearsay evidence that in the past has been admitted under the fresh-complaint doctrine nonetheless is, in most instances, properly admissible at trial under generally applicable evidentiary standards.Īccordingly, we conclude that the formulation and parameters of the fresh-complaint doctrine, as applied in this state, should be revised to reflect a more accurate understanding of the proper basis for the admission of such evidence. As recognized by courts in other jurisdictions, the validity of one of the historic premises of the doctrine-that it is natural for the victim of a sexual offense promptly to disclose the incident if it actually occurred-has been eroded substantially in contemporary times by numerous empirical studies. In recent years, the continuing validity of the fresh-complaint doctrine has been questioned by a number of legal scholars and commentators. Defendant further contends that, even if the fresh-complaint doctrine remains viable, evidence of the victim's out-of-court statements in the present case was not properly admissible under that doctrine, because the victim, a 12-year-old girl, did not voice the complaint promptly, and, when she ultimately did report the incidents, made the complaint only in response to questioning by an adult friend. In the case before us, defendant, initially asserting that the fresh-complaint doctrine is based upon false, outdated assumptions and misconceptions relating to the reactions of victims of sexual offenses, urges us to abolish this common law rule traditionally applicable in sexual offense cases. In California, the governing decisions have explained that the victim's extrajudicial "complaint" is admissible for a limited, nonhearsay purpose-namely, simply to establish that such a complaint was made-in order to forestall the trier of fact from inferring erroneously that no complaint was made, and from further concluding, as a result of that mistaken inference, that the victim in fact had not been sexually assaulted. Historically, under the common law fresh-complaint doctrine, evidence that the alleged victim of a sexual offense disclosed or reported the incident to another person shortly after its occurrence has been held admissible, as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief, in a subsequent criminal prosecution for that offense. Dikes, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. Harmon, Jr., County Counsel (San Diego), Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Gary C. Shigemoto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Kraft, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Rudy Kraft for Defendant and Appellant.ĭaniel E. (Opinion by George, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court.)Įleanor M. (Superior Court of Sacramento County, No. RICKY LEE BROWN, Defendant and Appellant.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |